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Abstract
In this paper, we study a shipping market with carriers providing service between
two locations. Shipments are classified into two categories: goods and waste.
Trade imbalance allows low-valued waste to be shipped at bargain rates. And if
imbalance still exists, empty containers have to be repositioned from a surplus lo-
cation to a shortage location. Carries decide prices, which will affect the demand.
We build a monopoly and a duopoly model to find the optimal pricing strategy for
carries. We also analyze how the profit of a carrier is affected by trade imbalance,
price sensitivity, cost structures and competition intensity.
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1 Introduction
Maritime transportation is vital to the development of world economy since there are no
other effective alternative to the long distance transportation of large amounts of freight.
And container shipping which provides shipping service in standard units has become
more and more important in international freight transportation since the mid-1960s.
According to UNCTAD (2014), container ships carry an estimated 52 percent of global
seaborne trade in terms of value. One main issue in the containerized transportation
is the empty container repositioning (ECR) problem due to the imbalance of container
flow. And it has become more conspicuous with the rapid growth of containerization
and the regional difference in economic development. Table 1 summarized the annual
containerized trade flows on three major trade routes for the years from 2009 to 2013.
It can be seen that the volume from Asia to Europe was more than double of that in the
opposite direction. And the similar situation exits on the transpacific route. Such huge
imbalance indicates the scale of empty container movements since the empty containers
have to be repositioned from a surplus area to a deficit area.
Table 1: Containerized trade flows on three major routes, 2009-2013 (Millions of TEUs)
Year Europe Asia Transpacific Transatlantic
Asia - Eur Eur - Asia Asia - NA NA - Asia Eur - NA NA - Eur
2009 11.5 5.5 10.6 6.1 2.8 2.5
2010 13.3 5.7 12.3 6.5 3.2 2.7
2011 14.1 6.2 12.4 6.6 3.4 2.8
2012 13.7 6.3 13.1 6.9 3.6 2.7
2013 14.1 6.4 13.8 7.4 3.8 2.8
Source: UNCTAD (2014)
Repositioning empty containers incurs extra cost but generates no profit. However,
it is unavoidable due to the trade imbalance among different regions. For example,
export-dominant ports like many ports in China are always in need of empty containers,
while import-dominant ports always have surplus empty containers. Shipping waste and
scrap instead of shipping empty containers has been adopted by practitioners to reduce
operational cost.
Waste and scrap include paper waste, plastic scrap, metal scrap and some other recy-
clable items. The trade imbalance allows these low-valued products to be economically
shipped in a long distance. Rather than having containers returned empty, carriers offer
bargain rates for these shipments to offset ECR cost. Shipping a container full of metal
scrap from Los Angeles to China is cheaper than sending it to Chicago by train (see
Ford (2013)). Although shipping waste does not make money, it may help reduce cost
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of repositioning empty containers. Besides, compared with using new materials, man-
ufacturing with recycled materials helps protect the environment and boost economic
efficiency. All these benefits encourage the development of waste shipments. According
to Morrison (2014), the U.S. sold $8.8 billion worth of waste and scrap to China in 2013,
which is about 7.2% of total U.S. exports to China. And European Commission (2014)
reported that the EU exported e 7.1 billion worth of waste and scrap to non-OECD
Decision countries in 2013.
Although shipping waste has attracted great interest from industry analysts, it goes
unnoticed by academics who study ECR problem. Actually, the purposes of shipping
goods and waste for carriers are different: shipping good is to make money and shipping
waste is to sustain the operations, just like repositioning empty containers. But the
previous academic research does not differentiate these two, and just uses ”laden con-
tainers” to differentiate from ”empty containers”. Besides, most work on ECR problem
aims to find optimal repositioning strategy given the imbalanced flow of demand, and
assumes that carriers can not affect demand by setting different prices. But in reality,
carriers will charge more to the customer in the headhaul and charge less to the customer
in the backhaul, so that the imbalance situation will be lessen.
We try to fill in this gap by studying the carrier’s pricing decision in a shipping
market with waste shipments and ECR. In this paper, the following questions will arise:
(1) What is the optimal pricing strategy for the carrier in a shipping market with
waste shipments and ECR?
(2) Under what conditions should the carrier ship waste instead of repositioning emp-
ty containers? And compared to the no waste shipment case, how much improvement
will be made?
(3) In case of competition, does the solution of Nash Equilibrium (NE) exists? If yes,
what is the pricing strategy for the carriers?
(4) How the profit of carrier will be affected by different parameters like trade imbal-
ance, cost structure, price sensitivity and competition intensity?
To address these problems, we first build a monopoly model to find and analyze the
carrier’s pricing strategy. The carrier’s strategy falls into four categories: seeking the
balance of goods; repositioning empty containers to achieve flow balance; shipping waste
to achieve flow balance; shipping waste and repositioning empty containers to achieve
flow balance. Compared with two traditional approaches, our approach generates more
profit. Furthermore, we build a duopoly model to analyze competition between two
symmetric carriers. We prove that there exists a unique NE in this game and solutions
are provided. We also do some sensitivity analysis based on the results of these two
models.
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The main contribution of this paper is two-fold. First, this is the first paper to
consider shipping waste in the container shipping market. Although shipping waste
alone does not make money, it may help carrier offset ECR cost under some conditions.
Second, most research on ECR problem assumes the demand of shipping service is given
and studies the optimal repositioning strategy. Our work allows the demand to be
affected by setting different prices, which further affects the number of empty containers
to be shipped.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a literature
review on ECR problem and competition issue in the shipping market. Section 3 intro-
duces the notations, assumptions and the model. We first analyze the pricing strategy
in case of monopoly, which is presented in Section 4. In Section 5, we study the com-
petition model with two symmetric carriers. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section
6.
2 Literature review
ECR problem has drawn a lot of research attention since the beginning of container-
ization. And most of such work focus on the optimal repositioning strategy given the
imbalanced flow of demand, that is the demand is not controllable and must be satisfied.
Moon et al. (2010) considered the ECR problem with leasing and purchasing containers
in a multi-port system. And mixed integer programming and genetic algorithms were
adopted to solve this problem. Li et al. (2007) developed a (U,D) policy to allocate
empty containers among multi-ports. For one port, empty containers are imported to
U if the number of empty containers is less than U, or exported to D if the number of
empty containers is more than D. And a heuristic algorithm was designed to compute
the specific allocation of empty containers among ports. Ng et al. (2012) developed
an optimal policy for empty container transfer problem between two adjacent port-
s/depots with backlogging and random demand and supply over a multi-period horizon.
Stochastic dynamic programming was used to formulate this problem and structural
characteristics of the optimal solution were presented. Song and Earl (2008) built an
integrated model to solve empty vehicle repositioning and fleet-sizing problem in a two-
depot system. A threshold control policy was presented as the optimal solution for the
empty vehicle reposition problem. Long et al. (2012) proposed a two-stage stochastic
programming model to minimize the ECR cost under random demand, supply and ship
capacities. And the sample average approximation method was used to solve the mod-
el with large-scale case. Erera et al. (2009) developed a robust optimization approach
to find a recoverable minimum cost repositioning plan. More research on ECR can be
found in Song and Dong (2015), which provided a comprehensive literature review on
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ECR problem mainly from the network scope.
All the above work assumes that the carrier can not affect demand. A recent work
by Lu et al. (2015) considers coordinating pricing and ECR problem in a two-depot
system. They used Markov decision process to formulate the problem and under mild
assumptions they derived explicit structure of optimal strategies which is given by a
price vector and two target inventory levels for inbound and outbound repositioning.
The carrier in our model can also affect demand by setting different prices, which further
affects the number of empty containers to be shipped. Besides, we consider shipping
waste as an alternative approach to realize flow balance.
Our work is also related to the research on competition in the shipping market.
Competition in the shipping industry is fierce and involves many different parties like
shippers, carriers, terminal operators and ports. A´lvarez-SanJaime et al. (2013) ana-
lyzed competition for freight transport between one road carrier and two liner shipping
carriers by taking into account economics of scale in the liner shipping market. Besides,
cooperative game model was adopted to analyze the horizontal integration between ship-
ping lines. Ishii et al. (2013) proposed a game-theoretical model to study competition
between two ports under demand uncertainty. Ports compete for customers by selecting
port charges and a unique NE exists in this game. A case study of competition between
the ports of Busan and Kobe was also presented. Lee et al. (2012) used a multi-level
hierarchical approach to model the competition among oligopolistic ocean carriers, land
carriers and terminal operators. Wang et al. (2014) studied the competition problem
between two carriers in a new emerging liner shipping market. Each carrier decides
optimal freight rate, service frequency and ship capacity to maximize his payoff. Three
game-theoretical models (Nash game, Stackelberg game and deterrence game) were fur-
ther investigated. They also considered a two-location market, but they assumed that
two carriers only compete for customers in one direction, that is they implicitly assumed
that the carriers have all containers returned empty.
Zhou and Lee (2009) is the most related work to ours. They built mathematical
models to find the optimal pricing strategies for carriers in a shipping market with
ECR. They also analyzed how market competition will affect carriers’ profit. But they
did not consider shipping waste and scrap, which is a useful tool for carriers to reduce
operational cost. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first one to study pricing
strategy in a shipping market with waste shipments.
5
3 Notations, assumptions and the model
Consider two liner shipping companies denoted by carrier 1 and 2 who compete on the
shipping service between two ports denoted by A and B. Two kinds of shipping service
are provided by both carriers: one is shipping goods which are usually of high value
and the service is priced at high rates; the other one is shipping waste and scrap, which
are low-valued products and the service is priced at low rates. There are potential
demands for these two kinds of service in both directions. Laden containers (for goods
and waste) and empty containers can be shipped in both directions. For convenience,
we use shipment 1 and 2 to represent goods shipment from A to B and from B to A,
respectively. And we use shipment 3 and 4 to represent waste shipment from A to B and
from B to A, respectively. Since it is a two-location closed system, surplus containers
need to be returned as empty containers, which are denoted by shipment 5 and 6.
The following notations are used in this paper and the superscript j denotes carrier
j(= 1, 2):
aji the potential demand of shipment i(= 1, 2, 3, 4)
bji the price sensitivity of shipment i(= 1, 2, 3, 4)
cji the cost of moving one container loaded with shipment i(= 1, 2, 3, 4)
cj5, c
j
6 the cost of moving one empty container from A to B and from B to A
dji the realized demand of shipment i(= 1, 2, 3, 4)
dj5, d
j
6 number of empty containers to be shipped from A to B and from B to A
pji the unit price of transporting shipment i(= 1, 2, 3, 4)
γji the competition intensity of shipment i(= 1, 2, 3, 4)
Carriers compete for customers in price and each carrier seeks to maximize his profit
by pricing the service. Define x+ = max(x, 0). Therefore, the optimization problem for
carrier j is:
max Πj(pj1, p
j
2, p
j
3, p
j
4) =
4∑
i=1
dji (p
j
i−cji )−(dj2 +dj4−dj1−dj3)+cj5−(dj1 +dj3−dj2−dj4)+cj6 (1)
subject to:
dji = a
j
i − bjipji + γji (pki − pji ), i = 1, 2, 3, 4 (2)
dji , p
j
i ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, 3, 4 (3)
The first item in (1) indicates the profit that the carrier collects from the shipper by
providing shipping service and the last two items indicate the ECR cost if there exists
any imbalance. We assume that for each shipment i, the demand for one carrier’s service
depends linearly on his own and rival’s price, which is indicated by (2). This says that
when carrier j cuts the price of shipment i by one unit, the demand will increase by
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(bji + γ
j
i ): b
j
i are the increased demand stimulated by cheaper price and the remaining
γji are demand attracted from the competitor. The larger γ
j
i means carrier j will grab
more market share from his competitor by lowering the same amount of price, hence
it can represent the intensity of competition. And the total demand for shipment i is
di(p
1
i , p
2
i ) = (a
1
i + a
2
i )− (b1i + γ1i − γ2i )p1i − (b2i + γ2i − γ1i )p2i . We assume that each carrier
sets his price so that his own demand is nonnegative. We use this assumption in order
to have a well-defined demand function for the other carrier if one decides not to provide
service. In addition, we assume that all demand can be satisfied, i.e. there is no capacity
constraint.
Note that all parameters are positive and we impose the following assumptions on
these parameters:
• cj5 < min(cj1, cj3) and cj6 < min(cj2, cj4), that is the cost of shipping one empty
container is less than the cost of shipping one laden container for each carrier.
The relationship between these costs is understandable and can be observed in the
industry.
• aj1 > bj1cj1, aj2 > bj2cj2, that is shipping goods is profitable if the price pji is in the
interval (cji , a
j
i/b
j
i ). In practice, shipping high-valued goods is the main source of
profits for the carrier.
• aj3 < bj3cj5, aj4 < bj4cj6, that is the pricing ceiling of shipping waste is below the
corresponding empty container repositioning cost for each carrier. This assumption
together with the first one indicate that transporting waste always loses money.
But compared to repositioning empty containers, shipping waste may be a better
way to achieve flow balance.
These assumptions facilitate our analysis and make the model more realistic.
4 Pricing strategy in a monopoly market
In this section, we first study the pricing strategy in case of monopoly. To study the
market with one carrier will give us a better understanding of pricing strategy with the
existence of waste shipment and ECR. And since shipping alliances are very popular in
the liner shipping sector, the monopoly model is an approximation when one shipping
alliance dominates some service route, using vessel-sharing agreement to offer integrated
services and maximizing joint profit.
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With only one carrier, we omit the superscript and the optimization problem is:
max Π(p1, p2, p3, p4) =
4∑
i=1
di(pi−ci)−(d2 +d4−d1−d3)+c5−(d1 +d3−d2−d4)+c6 (4)
subject to:
di = ai − bipi, i = 1, 2, 3, 4 (5)
di, pi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, 3, 4 (6)
In case of monopoly, there is no competition between carriers, so the demand func-
tion reduces to (5). The following proposition gives the carrier’s optimal pricing under
different market conditions and cost structure.
Proposition 1. In case of monopoly, the optimal pricing is as following:
(p∗1, p
∗
2, p
∗
3, p
∗
4) =
(a1/b1+c1+T02 ,
a2/b2+c2−T0
2 ,
a3
b3
, a4b4 ) if max(−(c3 − a3b3 ),−c5) < T0 < min(c4 − a4b4 , c6)
(a1/b1+c1+c62 ,
a2/b2+c2−c6
2 ,
a3
b3
, a4b4 ) if c6 ≤ T0 and c6 < c4 − a4b4
(a1/b1+c1−c52 ,
a2/b2+c2+c5
2 ,
a3
b3
, a4b4 ) if c5 ≤ −T0 and c5 < c3 − a3b3
(a1/b1+c1+T12 ,
a2/b2+c2−T1
2 ,
a3
b3
, a4/b4+c4−T12 ) if T1 ≤ a1b1 − c1 and c4 − a4b4 ≤ T1 < c6
(a1/b1+c1−T22 ,
a2/b2+c2+T2
2 ,
a3/b3+c3−T2
2 ,
a4
b4
) if T2 ≤ a2b2 − c2 and c3 − a3b3 ≤ T2 < c5
(a1/b1+c1+c62 ,
a2/b2+c2−c6
2 ,
a3
b3
, a4/b4+c4−c62 ) if c4 − a4b4 ≤ c6 ≤ min(a1b1 − c1, T1)
(a1/b1+c1−c52 ,
a2/b2+c2+c5
2 ,
a3/b3+c3−c5
2 ,
a4
b4
) if c3 − a3b3 ≤ c5 ≤ min(a2b2 − c2, T2)
where T0 =
(a1−b1c1)−(a2−b2c2)
b1+b2
, T1 =
(a1−b1c1)−(a2−b2c2)−(a4−b4c4)
b1+b2+b4
, T2 =
(a2−b2c2)−(a1−b1c1)−(a3−b3c3)
b1+b2+b3
.
And the corresponding demand and profit are summarized in Table 2.
We say that the realized demands of goods are balanced if d1 = d2, and imbalanced
otherwise. Since it is a two-location closed system, the carrier should always achieve
flow balance, i.e., d1 + d3 + d5 = d2 + d4 + d6. Then in case of imbalance, the carrier can
ship waste or empty containers, or take both measures.
From Proposition 1, we find that the relationship between Ti, (
ai
bi
− ci) and corre-
sponding ECR cost c5(c6) is the key factor to determine the carrier’s choice. Since
ai
bi
is the price ceiling of shipment i, (ai
bi
− ci)(i = 1, 2) is the maximum possible profit of
transporting one unit of goods. And (ci − aibi )(i = 3, 4) is the minimum possible loss of
transporting one unit of waste. The meaning of Ti is a bit confusing. Actually T0, T1, T2
satisfy the following three equations, respectively.
a1 − b1(c1 + T0) = a2 − b2(c2 − T0)
a1 − b1(c1 + T1) = a2 − b2(c2 − T1) + a4 − b4(c4 − T1)
a2 − b2(c2 + T2) = a1 − b1(c1 − T2) + a3 − b3(c3 − T2)
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That is, if the carrier charges shipment 1 and 2 at (c1 +T0) and (c2−T0), respectively,
he can achieve the balance of goods and get zero profit. Or if he charges shipment 1,
2 and 4 at (c1 + T1), (c2 − T1) and (c4 − T1), respectively, he doesn’t need to reposi-
tion empty containers and get zero profit. T2 can be analyzed in a similar way. So
we can regard T0, T1, T2 as balancing cost. More specifically, T0 is the balancing cost
when carrier only transports shipment 1 and 2. And T1(T2) is the balancing cost when
carrier only transports shipment 1, 2 and 4 (3). Here balancing has two meanings: no
empty containers to be shipped and break-even point. So if the balancing cost T0 is
the minimum compared to the loss of shipping waste and empty containers , the carrier
should seek the balance of goods, just as the results of Case 1.
If the ECR cost c5 (or c6) is the minimum compared to the balancing cost and loss of
shipping waste, the carrier should not seek the balance of goods but use empty containers
to achieve flow balance. The results in Case 2 (Case 3 is its symmetric case) shows that
the carrier should ignore the waste shipments and treat two directions of goods shipments
independently. For shipment 1, the carrier solves the problem max d1(p1 − (c1 + c6)).
And for shipment 2, the carrier solves the problem max d2(p2− (c2−c6)). The shipment
of goods from B to A lessens the imbalance situation, so the carrier motivates customers
in this direction with incentives (negative repositioning cost). And since the shipment of
goods from A to B worsens the imbalance situation, the carrier charges more (positive
repositioning cost) to the customers in this direction.
But when c3− a3b3 (or c4− a4b4 ) is minimum, the result is more complicated: the carrier
may only ship waste to achieve flow balance (Case 4 and 5) or take both measures
(Case 6 and 7). Unlike the empty container repositioning cost, which is fixed, the loss
of shipping waste depends on the price charged by the carrier, which is in the interval
[0, ai
bi
]. As long as c3 − p3 < c5 (or c4 − p4 < c6), shipping waste is a cost saving way
compared to shipping empty containers back. However, the amount of waste shipments
is limited by the demand function, while the carrier can always ship all the surplus
containers back if he wants. When the waste shipments are not enough to realize flow
balance, the carrier should reposition surplus containers.
The condition in Case 4 (Case 5 is its symmetric case) implies c4 − a4b4 ≤ T0 and
T1 < c6, that is, the loss of shipping waste is less than the balancing cost T0, so the
carrier should ship waste. And balancing cost T1 is less than c6, so the carrier should
not ship empty containers.
The condition in Case 6 (Case 7 is its symmetric case) implies c4 − a4b4 ≤ c6 and
c6 ≤ T1. The ECR cost is less than the balancing cost T1, so apart from shipping waste,
the carrier should also reposition empty containers
Based on the above analysis, the carrier’s pricing strategy can be summarized in the
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following proposition:
Proposition 2. In case of monopoly,
(1) If max(−(c3 − a3b3 ),−c5) < T0 < min(c4 − a4b4 , c6), the carrier should seek the
balance of goods;
(2) If c6 ≤ T0 and c6 < c4 − a4b4 (or c5 ≤ −T0 and c5 < c3 − a3b3 ), the carrier should
reposition empty containers to achieve flow balance;
(3) If T1 ≤ a1b1 − c1 and c4 − a4b4 ≤ T1 < c6 (or T2 ≤ a2b2 − c2 and c3 − a3b3 ≤ T2 < c5),
the carrier should ship waste to achieve flow balance;
(4) If c4− a4b4 ≤ c6 ≤ min(a1b1 − c1, T1) (or c3− a3b3 ≤ c5 ≤ min(a2b2 − c2, T2)), the carrier
should ship waste and reposition empty containers to achieve flow balance.
Next, we will analyze how the profit of a carrier is affected by different parameters.
The fundamental reason for ECR problem is the trade imbalance, so we first investi-
gate how potential demand imbalance of normal goods will affect the carrier’s profit. We
fix the sum of potential demand of shipment 1 and 2, which equals to 100,000 TEUs and
draw the figure of carrier’s profit varying on potential imbalance, defined as (a1 − a2).
The value of other parameters are shown in the figure and the difference between Figure
1(a) and Figure 1(b) is the value of shipment 1’s price sensitivity.
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Figure 1: Profit varying on potential imbalance
The upper line in the Figure 1(a) shows that as the potential imbalance goes from
-50,000 to 50,00 , the carrier’s profit first decreases, then remains unchanged, then
increases. When the potential demand of goods in direction AB is significantly smaller
than that in the opposite direction, the carrier first chooses to ship waste and reposition
empty containers to realize the flow balance. Then, as the imbalance situation lessens,
waste shipment is enough to realize flow balance. And when the imbalance lies in
[−18000, 18000], the optimal strategy for the carrier is to seek the balance of goods.
When a3 = a4 = 30, 000, shipping empty containers back is always a cost saving way to
achieve flow balance compared to shipping waste, so the carrier either seeks the balance
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of goods or reposition empty containers to achieve flow balance. An interesting thing
is that the demand imbalance will not damage the carrier’s profit. On the contrary,
when the potential imbalance is large enough, the carrier will make more profit as the
imbalance situation intensifies.
Proposition 3. In case of monopoly,
(1) The profit of the carrier always decreases in the unit cost of shipping goods c1 and
c2;
(2) The profit of the carrier decreases in the unit cost of shipping waste c3 (c4) if
parameters satisfy conditions in Case 5 and 7 (Case 4 and 6) and remains unchanged
in other cases;
(3) The profit of the carrier decreases in the unit ECR cost c5 (c6) if parameters
satisfy conditions in Case 3 and 7 (Case 2 and 6) and remains unchanged in other
cases.
It is intuitive to get Proposition 3 as the profit is decreasing in the cost. And under
some conditions, the carrier will not ship waste or empty containers, so the profit may
not be influenced by the cost of shipping waste or the cost of shipping empty containers.
But when it goes to the duopoly model, results can be quite different (see Proposition
8).
Proposition 4. In case of monopoly,
(1) The profit of the carrier always decreases in the price sensitivity of goods b1 and
b2;
(2) The profit of the carrier decreases in the price sensitivity of waste b3 (b4) if
parameters satisfy conditions in Case 5 and 7 (Case 4 and 6) and remains unchanged
in other cases.
The price sensitivity measures how the demand is affected by the price and a higher
price sensitivity means that the carrier will lose more customers if he increases the price
by the same amount. Therefore, the carrier can not capture more revenue from the
shipper at a higher price sensitivity.
Now we will compare our pricing strategy with two traditional approaches. In cur-
rent shipping industry, laden container transportation and ECR are usually considered
separately, and the ECR decisions are made after the laden container transportation is
planned. Then the decision maker for the laden containers will ignore shipping waste
since it is always losing money. After the demand of goods is realized, surplus containers
will be repositioned from a surplus location to a deficit location. Based on this idea, the
optimization problem is: max Π(p1, p2) = d1(p1 − c1) + d2(p2 − c2). Under this policy,
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the carrier essentially treats goods shipment in two directions independently. And the
optimal solution is easy to find: p∗i =
ai/bi+ci
2
, i = 1, 2. The corresponding profit after
deducting the repositioning cost is: Π∗ =
∑2
i=1
(ai−bici)2
4bi
− b1+b2
2
(c6T
+
0 + c5T
−
0 ).
The second one is discussed by Zhou and Lee (2009). In their model, the carrier
considers ECR cost when making decisions on laden containers, but the carrier only
ships goods. Therefore, the objective function for the carrier is: max Π(p1, p2) = d1(p1−
c1) + d2(p2 − c2)− c5(d2 − d1)+ − c6(d1 − d2)+, and the optimal pricing is:
(p∗1, p
∗
2) =

(a1/b1+c1+T0
2
, a2/b2+c2−T0
2
) if −c5 < T0 < c6
(a1/b1+c1+c6
2
, a2/b2+c2−c6
2
) if T0 ≥ c6
(a1/b1+c1−c5
2
, a2/b2+c2+c5
2
) if T0 ≤ −c5
Let ∆1 and ∆2 denote the differences in profit of our approach and two traditional
approaches respectively, then we have the following results:
Table 3: Differences in profit of our approach and two traditional approaches
Cases ∆1 ∆2
Case 1 b1+b2
4
[(2c6 − T+0 )T+0 + (2c5 − T−0 )T−0 ] 0
Case 2
(b1+b2)c
2
6
4
0
Case 3
(b1+b2)c
2
5
4
0
Case 4
(a4−b4(c4−T1))2
4b4
+
(b1+b2)(T
2
1+2T0(c6−T1))
4
if T0 < c6:
(a4−b4(c4−T1))2
4b4
+
(b1+b2)(T0−T1)2
4
if T0 ≥ c6: (a4−b4(c4−T1))
2
4b4
+
(b1+b2)(c6−T1)(2T0−T1−c6)
4
Case 5
(a3−b3(c3−T2))2
4b3
+
(b1+b2)(T
2
2−2T0(c5−T2))
4
if −T0 < c5: (a3−b3(c3−T2))
2
4b3
+
(b1+b2)(−T0−T2)2
4
if −T0 ≥ c5: (a3−b3(c3−T2))
2
4b3
+
(b1+b2)(c5−T2)(−2T0−T2−c5)
4
Case 6
(a4−b4(c4−c6))2
4b4
+
(b1+b2)c
2
6
4
(a4−b4(c4−c6))2
4b4
Case 7
(a3−b3(c3−c5))2
4b3
+
(b1+b2)c
2
5
4
(a3−b3(c3−c5))2
4b3
Note that ∆1 ≥ 0 and ∆2 ≥ 0 for all cases. Compared with the first one, our approach
always generates more profit(unless a1 − b1c1 = a2 − b2c2, then ∆1 = 0). Rather than
treating customers in two directions equally, we charge less to the customers who lessen
the imbalance situation, and charge more to the customers who worsen the imbalance
situation. The cost saving on repositioning empty containers is more than the decrease
in profit of shipping goods. This emphasizes the importance of considering ECR problem
when pricing shipping service.
Compared with Zhou and Lee’s, our approach also has better results. When the
parameters satisfy first three conditions, both pricing schemes do not transport waste
shipments, so the profits are the same. But in the last four cases, shipping waste is
a cost-saving strategy compared to repositioning empty containers, so our approach
generates more profit. Even though shipping waste alone is always losing money, it
should be considered as an alternative option for achieving flow balance sometimes.
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5 Pricing strategy in a duopoly market
The first model only considers the market with one carrier or without competition. Now
we consider the situation where two carriers choose prices simultaneously and indepen-
dently to maximize their own profit. Here we only consider the symmetric carriers, so we
assume a1i = a
2
i = ai, b
1
i = b
2
i = bi, γ
1
i = γ
2
i = γi, c
1
i = c
2
i = ci, c
1
5 = c
2
5 = c5, c
1
6 = c
2
6 = c6.
Having symmetric carriers facilitates our analysis while still allowing us to obtain inter-
esting insights relating to the presence of competition. Then the optimization problem
for carrier j(= 1, 2) is:
max Πj(pj1, p
j
2, p
j
3, p
j
4) =
4∑
i=1
dji (p
j
i−ci)−(dj2 +dj4−dj1−dj3)+c5−(dj1 +dj3−dj2−dj4)+c6 (8)
subject to:
dji = ai − bipji + γi(pki − pji ), i = 1, 2, 3, 4 (9)
dji , p
j
i ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, 3, 4 (10)
Theorem 1. There exists a unique symmetric pure strategy NE in this game.
This theorem means that we can make a unique prediction of carriers’ pricing de-
cisions and no carrier has the incentive to deviate from this NE. Besides, the price
decisions of two carriers are the same, which are given in the next proposition.
Proposition 5. In case of duopoly with symmetric carriers, the NE prices are as fol-
lowing:
(pj∗1 , p
j∗
2 , p
j∗
3 , p
j∗
4 ) =
(
a1/(b1+γ1)+c1+T
D
0
2−ρ1 ,
a2/(b2+γ2)+c2−TD0
2−ρ2 ,
a3
b3
, a4b4 ) if max(−(c3 − a3b3 ),−c5) < TD0 < min(c4 − a4b4 , c6)
(a1/(b1+γ1)+c1+c62−ρ1 ,
a2/(b2+γ2)+c2−c6
2−ρ2 ,
a3
b3
, a4b4 ) if c6 ≤ TD0 , c6 < c4 − a4b4
(a1/(b1+γ1)+c1−c52−ρ1 ,
a2/(b2+γ2)+c2+c5
2−ρ2 ,
a3
b3
, a4b4 ) if c5 ≤ −TD0 , c5 < c3 − a3b3
(
a1/(b1+γ1)+c1+T
D
1
2−ρ1 ,
a2/(b2+γ2)+c2−TD1
2−ρ2 ,
a3
b3
,
a4/(b4+γ4)+c4−TD1
2−ρ4 ) if T
D
1 ≤ a1b1 − c1, c4 − a4b4 ≤ TD1 < c6
(
a1/(b1+γ1)+c1−TD2
2−ρ1 ,
a2/(b2+γ2)+c2+T
D
2
2−ρ2 ,
a3/(b3+γ3)+c3−TD2
2−ρ3 ,
a4
b4
) if TD2 ≤ a2b2 − c2, c3 − a3b3 ≤ TD2 < c5
(a1/(b1+γ1)+c1+c62−ρ1 ,
a2/(b2+γ2)+c2−c6
2−ρ2 ,
a3
b3
, a4/(b4+γ4)+c4−c62−ρ4 ) if c4 − a4b4 ≤ c6 ≤ min(a1b1 − c1, TD1 )
(a1/(b1+γ1)+c1−c52−ρ1 ,
a2/(b2+γ2)+c2+c5
2−ρ2 ,
a3/(b3+γ3)+c3−c5
2−ρ3 ,
a4
b4
) if c3 − a3b3 ≤ c5 ≤ min(a2b2 − c2, TD2 )
where TD0 =
a1−b1c1
2−ρ1 −
a2−b2c2
2−ρ2
b1
2−ρ1+
b2
2−ρ2
, TD1 =
a1−b1c1
2−ρ1 −
a2−b2c2
2−ρ2 −
a4−b4c4
2−ρ4
b1
2−ρ1+
b2
2−ρ2+
b4
2−ρ4
, TD2 =
a2−b2c2
2−ρ2 −
a1−b1c1
2−ρ1 −
a3−b3c3
2−ρ3
b1
2−ρ1+
b2
2−ρ2+
b3
2−ρ3
, ρi =
γi
bi+γi
. And the corresponding demand and profit are summarized in Table 4.
By conducting a similar analysis used in the monopoly model, each carrier’s pricing
strategy can be summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 6. In case of duopoly with symmetric carriers,
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(1) If max(−(c3 − a3b3 ),−c5) < TD0 < min(c4 − a4b4 , c6), each carrier should seek the
balance of goods;
(2) If c6 ≤ TD0 and c6 < c4− a4b4 (or c5 ≤ −TD0 and c5 < c3− a3b3 ), each carrier should
reposition empty containers to achieve flow balance;
(3) If TD1 ≤ a1b1 − c1 and c4− a4b4 ≤ TD1 < c6 (or TD2 ≤ a2b2 − c2 and c3− a3b3 ≤ TD2 < c5),
each carrier should ship waste to achieve flow balance;
(4) If c4 − a4b4 ≤ c6 ≤ min(a1b1 − c1, TD1 ) (or c3 − a3b3 ≤ c5 ≤ min(a2b2 − c2, TD2 )), each
carrier should ship waste and reposition empty containers to achieve flow balance.
Compared to Proposition 2, the only difference is that Ti changes into T
D
i . And if
ρ1 = ρ2 = ρ3 = ρ4, we have Ti=T
D
i , which means the conditions under which the carrier
should seek the balance of goods or use empty containers and waste shipments to achieve
flow balance for monopoly case and duopoly case are the same, although the prices and
realized demands are different, so are the profits.
Now we will compare the results of duopoly model with those of monopoly model.
If the competition intensity γi(= 1, 2, 3, 4) equals to zero, two carriers can be treated as
providing service in two separate markets, but only having half of the potential demand.
Then compared with the case of monopoly, each carrier sets the same price but the
demand is halved, so the profit is also halved. And the total profit of two carriers are
the same as that of the monopolist. When the competition exists, carrier will cut his
own price to attract demand from the competitor. Although each carrier’s demand is
more than half of the monopolist’s, the total profit of two carriers is decreasing. That
is how strategic alliance will benefit carriers apart from reducing cost via economies of
scale and increasing the utilization of space. The impact of competition intensity will
be further investigated in the next proposition.
Proposition 7. In case of duopoly with symmetric carriers,
(1) The profit of each carrier always decreases in the competition intensity of goods
γ1 and γ2;
(2) The profit of each carrier decreases in the competition intensity of waste γ3 (γ4)
if parameters satisfy conditions in Case 5 and 7 (Case 4 and 6) and remains unchanged
in other cases.
As γi increases, carrier has more incentives to lower his own price so that he can
attract more demand from his rival. But the increase in demand can not compensate
for the decrease in unit profit. Finally, the price war becomes a lose-lose game. And
the profit will not be affected by the competition intensity γ3 (γ4) sometimes, because
carrier will not transport shipment 3 (4) at all under some circumstances.
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Proposition 8. In case of duopoly with symmetric carriers,
(1) If parameters satisfy conditions in Case 3, the profit of each carrier is decreasing
(unchanging, increasing) in the ECR cost c5 if c5 < (=, >)
a2−b2c2
(2−ρ2)2/(1−ρ2)
− a1−b1c1
(2−ρ1)2/(1−ρ1)
b1
(2−ρ1)2/(1−ρ1)
+
b2
(2−ρ2)2/(1−ρ2)
;
(2) If parameters satisfy conditions in Case 2, the profit of each carrier is decreasing
(unchanging, increasing) in the ECR cost c6 if c6 < (=, >)
a1−b1c1
(2−ρ1)2/(1−ρ1)
− a2−b2c2
(2−ρ2)2/(1−ρ2)
b1
(2−ρ1)2/(1−ρ1)
+
b2
(2−ρ2)2/(1−ρ2)
;
(3) If parameters satisfy conditions in Case 7, the profit of each carrier is decreasing
(unchanging, increasing) in the ECR cost c5 if c5 < (=, >)
a2−b2c2
(2−ρ2)2/(1−ρ2)
− a1−b1c1
(2−ρ1)2/(1−ρ1)
− a3−b3c3
(2−ρ3)2/(1−ρ3)
b1
(2−ρ1)2/(1−ρ1)
+
b2
(2−ρ2)2/(1−ρ2)
+
b3
(2−ρ3)2/(1−ρ3)
;
(4) If parameters satisfy conditions in Case 6, the profit of each carrier is decreasing
(unchanging, increasing) in the ECR cost c6 if c6 < (=, >)
a1−b1c1
(2−ρ1)2/(1−ρ1)
− a2−b2c2
(2−ρ2)2/(1−ρ2)
− a4−b4c4
(2−ρ4)2/(1−ρ4)
b1
(2−ρ1)2/(1−ρ1)
+
b2
(2−ρ2)2/(1−ρ2)
+
b4
(2−ρ4)2/(1−ρ4)
;
(5) If parameters satisfy conditions in Case 1, 4 and 5, the profit of each carrier
remains unchanged in the ECR cost c5 and c6.
It is unusual to see that the profit may increase in the ECR cost sometimes. As the
ECR cost increases, the carrier will try to reduce the trade imbalance. Under Case 3,
the increase in c5 leads to: (1) decrease in equilibrium price and increase in equilibrium
demand of shipment 1; (2) increase in equilibrium price and decrease in equilibrium
demand of shipment 2; (3) decrease in the number of empty containers to be shipped
from A to B. The final effect on the profit depends on whether the positive effect or the
negative effect will dominate. And only when c5 increases to
a2−b2c2
(2−ρ2)2/(1−ρ2)
− a1−b1c1
(2−ρ1)2/(1−ρ1)
b1
(2−ρ1)2/(1−ρ1)
+
b2
(2−ρ2)2/(1−ρ2)
,
the positive effect will outweigh the negative effect; otherwise, the profit is decreasing
in the c5 (see Figure 2(a)). Note that c5 ≤ −TD0 , and
a2−b2c2
(2−ρ2)2/(1−ρ2)
− a1−b1c1
(2−ρ1)2/(1−ρ1)
b1
(2−ρ1)2/(1−ρ1)
+
b2
(2−ρ2)2/(1−ρ2)
< −TD0
can be possible only when ρ1 < ρ2. Therefore, the increase in ECR cost leading to the
increase in the profit will not happen in the monopoly market (ρ1 = ρ2 = 0). The effect
of c5 on the profit under Case 7 can be analyzed in a similar way and the numerical
result is in Figure 2(b).
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Figure 2: Profit varying on ECR cost c5
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Waste shipment 3 plays a similar role under Case 5, so the profit may increase in the
unit cost of shipment 3 sometimes (see Figure 3).
600 610 620 630 640 650
31
.1
08
31
.1
12
c3
Pr
of
it 
(m
illio
n)
a1=a2=50000,a3=a4=60000,
b1=23,b2=20,b3=b4=100, 
r1=r2=10,r3=r4=100,
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Figure 3: Profit varying on c3
Since the profit may increase in the ECR cost and waste shipment cost, how about
pricing as if the carrier has higher cost? As a result, the carrier will be worse off if he
unilaterally deviates from the NE prices. This can be seen from the definition of NE.
Only when two carriers act in the same way, this strategy will generate more profits.
6 Conclusions
In spite of much research on ECR, little has considered shipping waste and scrap, which
is an environmentally-friendly and cost-effective alternative approach to achieve flow
balance. In this paper, we study optimal pricing strategies for carriers in a monopoly
and duopoly market with waste shipment and ECR. Depending on different market
conditions and cost structure, the carrier’s strategy falls into four groups: seeking the
balance of goods; repositioning empty containers to achieve flow balance; shipping waste
to achieve flow balance; shipping waste and repositioning empty containers to achieve
flow balance. Compared with work without waste shipment, our model generates bet-
ter results. We also investigate how the profit is affected by trade imbalance, price
sensitivity, cost structures and competition intensity.
One limitation of our work is that we only consider a two-port closed system, which
is a simplification of complicated shipping network in the real life. One may study a
multi-port system with routing decision, but the analysis can he far more challenging.
Besides, we use a deterministic linear model to describe the demand function which fails
to capture the uncertainty in the shipping market. Some stochastic models like additive
model, multiplicative model and logit model can be used in the further research.
18
References
A´lvarez-SanJaime, O´., P. Cantos-Sa´nchez, R. Moner-Colonques, and J. J. Sempere-
Monerris (2013). Competition and horizontal integration in maritime freight trans-
port. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review 51, 67–81.
Cachon, G. P. and S. Netessine (2004). Game theory in supply chain analysis. In
Handbook of Quantitative Supply Chain Analysis, pp. 13–65. Springer.
Debreu, G. (1952). A social equilibrium existence theorem. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 38 (10), 886.
Erera, A. L., J. C. Morales, and M. Savelsbergh (2009). Robust optimization for empty
repositioning problems. Operations Research 57 (2), 468–483.
European Commission (2014). Waste shipment. http://ec.europa.eu/trade/
import-and-export-rules/export-from-eu/waste-shipment/. Accessed Novem-
ber 24, 2014.
Fan, K. (1952). Fixed-point and minimax theorems in locally convex topological linear
spaces. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of
America 38 (2), 121.
Ford, P. (2013). China puts up a green wall to us trash. http://www.csmonitor.com/
World/Asia-Pacific/2013/0619/China-puts-up-a-green-wall-to-US-trash/.
Accessed March 20, 2015.
Glicksberg, I. L. (1952). A further generalization of the kakutani fixed point theorem,
with application to nash equilibrium points. Proceedings of the American Mathemat-
ical Society 3 (1), 170–174.
Ishii, M., P. T.-W. Lee, K. Tezuka, and Y.-T. Chang (2013). A game theoretical analysis
of port competition. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation
Review 49 (1), 92–106.
Lee, H., M. Boile, S. Theofanis, and S. Choo (2012). Modeling the oligopolistic and
competitive behavior of carriers in maritime freight transportation networks. Procedia-
Social and Behavioral Sciences 54, 1080–1094.
Li, J.-A., S. C. Leung, Y. Wu, and K. Liu (2007). Allocation of empty containers between
multi-ports. European Journal of Operational Research 182 (1), 400–412.
Long, Y., L. H. Lee, and E. P. Chew (2012). The sample average approximation method
for empty container repositioning with uncertainties. European Journal of Operational
Research 222 (1), 65–75.
19
Lu, T., C.-Y. Lee, and L.-H. Lee (2015). Coordinating pricing and empty container
repositioning: an analysis of two-depot shipping systems. Manuscript submitted for
publication.
Moon, I.-K., A.-D. Do Ngoc, and Y.-S. Hur (2010). Positioning empty containers among
multiple ports with leasing and purchasing considerations. OR spectrum 32 (3), 765–
786.
Morrison, W. M. (2014). China-us trade issues.
Ng, C. T., D.-P. Song, and T. Cheng (2012). Optimal policy for inventory transfer be-
tween two depots with backlogging. Automatic Control, IEEE Transactions on 57 (12),
3247–3252.
Song, D.-P. and J.-X. Dong (2015). Empty container repositioning. In Handbook of
Ocean Container Transport Logistics, pp. 163–208. Springer.
Song, D.-P. and C. F. Earl (2008). Optimal empty vehicle repositioning and fleet-sizing
for two-depot service systems. European Journal of Operational Research 185 (2),
760–777.
UNCTAD (2014). Review of Maritime Transport 2014. United Nations Publications.
Wang, H., Q. Meng, and X. Zhang (2014). Game-theoretical models for competition
analysis in a new emerging liner container shipping market. Transportation Research
Part B: Methodological 70, 201–227.
Zhou, W.-H. and C.-Y. Lee (2009). Pricing and competition in a transportation market
with empty equipment repositioning. Transportation Research Part B: Methodologi-
cal 43 (6), 677–691.
20
Appendix
A.1 Proof of proposition 1
Define two new problems:
PM : max Π(p1, p2, p3, p4) =
4∑
i=1
di(pi − ci)− (d2 + d4 − d1 − d3)c5
subject to:
d2 + d4 − d1 − d3 ≥ 0
di = ai − bipi, i = 1, 2, 3, 4
di, pi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, 3, 4
PM : max Π(p1, p2, p3, p4) =
4∑
i=1
di(pi − ci)− (d1 + d3 − d2 − d4)c6
subject to:
d1 + d3 − d2 − d4 ≥ 0
di = ai − bipi, i = 1, 2, 3, 4
di, pi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, 3, 4
Let p∗,p and p denote the optimal solutions of original problem denoted by PM and
two new problems PM PM , respectively. And the corresponding demand and optimal
value of these three problems are d∗, d, d and Π∗, Π, Π.Then we must have Π∗ =
max(Π,Π). (Since p is feasible to PM , we have Π∗ ≥∑4i=1 di(pi − ci)− (d2 + d4 − d1 −
d3)
+c5−(d1 +d3−d2−d4)+c6 =
∑4
i=1 di(pi−ci)−(d2 +d4−d1−d3)c5 = Π. Similarly, we
have Π∗ ≥ Π, then Π∗ ≥ max(Π,Π). Besides, if d∗2+d∗4−d∗1−d∗3 ≥ 0, then p∗ is feasible to
PM , so we have Π ≥∑4i=1 d∗i (p∗i−ci)−(d∗2+d∗4−d∗1−d∗3)c5 = Π∗. And if d∗2+d∗4−d∗1−d∗3 <
0, then p∗ is feasible to PM , so we have Π ≥∑4i=1 d∗i (p∗i −ci)−(d∗1 +d∗3−d∗2−d∗4)c6 = Π∗.
Therefore, Π∗ ≤ max(Π,Π).)
PM is a convex programming problem, and we can use Karush-Kuhn-Tucker condi-
tions to solve. The optimal pricing for PM is given by:
(p1, p2, p3, p4) =

(a1/b1+c1+T02 ,
a2/b2+c2−T0
2 ,
a3
b3
, a4b4 ) if max(−c5, a3b3 − c3)) < T0 < c4 − a4b4
(a1/b1+c1−c52 ,
a2/b2+c2+c5
2 ,
a3
b3
, a4b4 ) if c5 ≤ −T0 and c5 < c3 − a3b3
(a1/b1+c1+T12 ,
a2/b2+c2−T1
2 ,
a3
b3
, a4/b4+c4−T12 ) if c4 − a4b4 ≤ T1 ≤ a1b1 − c1
(a1/b1+c1−T22 ,
a2/b2+c2+T2
2 ,
a3/b3+c3−T2
2 ,
a4
b4
) if T2 < c5 and c3 − a3b3 ≤ T2 ≤ a2b2 − c2
(a1/b1+c1−c52 ,
a2/b2+c2+c5
2 ,
a3/b3+c3−c5
2 ,
a4
b4
) if c3 − a3b3 ≤ c5 ≤ min(a2b2 − c2, T2)
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PM is quite similar to PM and the optimal pricing can be obtained in the same way.
Then we only need to compare the profits in these two problems and find the optimal
solution for the original problem PM . The comparing process is easy but tedious for
writing, so we omit this part.
Then we can calculate the corresponding demand and profit by d∗i = ai − bip∗i and
Π∗ =
∑4
i=1 d
∗
i (p
∗
i−ci)−(d∗2+d∗4−d∗1−d∗3)+c5−(d∗1+d∗3−d∗2−d∗4)+c6, which is summarized
in Table 2.
A.2 Proof of proposition 2
This proposition follows the results in Table 2.
A.3 Proof of proposition 3
We only analyze the impact of c1, c3 and c5, and the impact of c2, c4 and c6 can be
analyzed in a similar way.
(1)
∂Π∗
∂c1
= − b2
b1 + b2
a1 − b1(c1 + T0)
2
− b1
b1 + b2
a2 − b2(c2 − T0)
2
= −d∗1 < 0 (Case 1)
∂Π∗
∂c1
= −a1 − b1(c1 + c6)
2
= −d∗1 < 0 (Case 2)
∂Π∗
∂c1
= −a1 − b1(c1 − c5)
2
= −d∗1 < 0 (Case 3)
∂Π∗
∂c1
= − b2 + b4
b1 + b2 + b4
a1 − b1(c1 + T1)
2
− b1
b1 + b2 + b4
a2 − b2(c2 − T1)
2
− b1
b1 + b2 + b4
a4 − b4(c4 − T1)
2
= −d∗1 < 0 (Case 4)
∂Π∗
∂c1
= − b2 + b3
b1 + b2 + b3
a1 − b1(c1 − T2)
2
− b1
b1 + b2 + b3
a2 − b2(c2 + T2)
2
+
b1
b1 + b2 + b4
a3 − b3(c3 − T2)
2
= −d∗1 < 0 (Case 5)
∂Π∗
∂c1
= −a1 − b1(c1 + c6)
2
= −d∗1 < 0 (Case 6)
∂Π∗
∂c1
= −a1 − b1(c1 − c5)
2
= −d∗1 < 0 (Case 7)
(2)
∂Π∗
∂c3
=
b3
b1 + b2 + b3
a1 − b1(c1 − T2)
2
− b3
b1 + b2 + b3
a2 − b2(c2 + T2)
2
− b1 + b2
b1 + b2 + b4
a3 − b3(c3 − T2)
2
= −d∗3 < 0 (Case 5)
∂Π∗
∂c3
= −a3 − b3(c3 − c5)
2
= −d∗3 < 0 (Case 7)
∂Π∗
∂c3
= 0 (Case 1 2 3 4 and 6)
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(3)
∂Π∗
∂c5
=
a1 − b1(c1 − c5)
2
− a2 − b2(c2 + c5)
2
= −d∗5 < 0 (Case 3)
∂Π∗
∂c5
=
a1 − b1(c1 − c5)
2
− a2 − b2(c2 + c5)
2
+
a3 − b3(c3 − c5)
2
= −d∗5 < 0 (Case 7)
∂Π∗
∂c5
= 0 (Case 1 2 4 5 and 6)
A.4 Proof of proposition 4
We only analyze the impact of b1 and b3, and the impact of b2 and b4 can be analyzed
in a similar way.
(1)
∂Π∗
∂b1
=
(a1 − b1(c1 + T0))2
4b21
− a1
b21
a1 − b1(c1 + T0)
2
+
c1 + T0
b1 + b2
(
a1 − b1(c1 + T0)
2
− a2 − b2(c2 − T0)
2
)
=
d∗1(d
∗
1 − a1)
b21
= −d
∗
1p
∗
1
b1
< 0 (Case 1)
∂Π∗
∂b1
=
(a1 − b1(c1 + c6))2
4b21
− a1
b21
a1 − b1(c1 + c6)
2
=
d∗1(d
∗
1 − a1)
b21
= −d
∗
1p
∗
1
b1
< 0 (Case 2)
∂Π∗
∂b1
=
(a1 − b1(c1 − c5))2
4b21
− a1
b21
a1 − b1(c1 − c5)
2
=
d∗1(d
∗
1 − a1)
b21
= −d
∗
1p
∗
1
b1
< 0 (Case 3)
∂Π∗
∂b1
=
c1 + T1
b1 + b2 + b4
(
a1 − b1(c1 + T1)
2
− a2 − b2(c2 − T1)
2
− a4 − b4(c4 − T1)
2
)
+
(a1 − b1(c1 + T1))2
4b21
− a1
b21
a1 − b1(c1 + T1)
2
=
d∗1(d
∗
1 − a1)
b21
= −d
∗
1p
∗
1
b1
< 0 (Case 4)
∂Π∗
∂b1
=
c1 − T2
b1 + b2 + b3
(
a1 − b1(c1 − T2)
2
− a2 − b2(c2 + T2)
2
+
a3 − b3(c3 − T2)
2
)
+
(a1 − b1(c1 − T2))2
4b21
− a1
b21
a1 − b1(c1 − T2)
2
=
d∗1(d
∗
1 − a1)
b21
= −d
∗
1p
∗
1
b1
< 0 (Case 5)
∂Π∗
∂b1
=
(a1 − b1(c1 + c6))2
4b21
− a1
b21
a1 − b1(c1 + c6)
2
=
d∗1(d
∗
1 − a1)
b21
= −d
∗
1p
∗
1
b1
< 0 (Case 6)
∂Π∗
∂b1
=
(a1 − b1(c1 − c5))2
4b21
− a1
b21
a1 − b1(c1 − c5)
2
=
d∗1(d
∗
1 − a1)
b21
= −d
∗
1p
∗
1
b1
< 0 (Case 7)
(2)
∂Π∗
∂b3
=
c3 − T2
b1 + b2 + b3
(
a1 − b1(c1 − T2)
2
− a2 − b2(c2 + T2)
2
+
a3 − b3(c3 − T2)
2
)
+
(a3 − b3(c3 − T2))2
4b23
− a3
b23
a3 − b3(c3 − T2)
2
=
d∗3(d
∗
3 − a3)
b23
= −d
∗
3p
∗
3
b3
< 0 (Case 5)
∂Π∗
∂b3
=
(a3 − b3(c3 − c5))2
4b23
− a3
b23
a3 − b3(c3 − c5)
2
=
d∗3(d
∗
3 − a3)
b23
= −d
∗
3p
∗
3
b3
< 0 (Case 7)
∂Π∗
∂b3
= 0 (Case 1 2 3 4 and 6)
23
A.5 Proof of theorem 1
The result is proven in three steps:
(1) Existence of NE
Debreu (1952), Glicksberg (1952) and Fan (1952) suggest that ”Game G = (Si, pii)
n
i=1
has a pure strategy NE if the strategy space for each player Si is convex and compact; the
payoff function pii is quasi concave in si; the payoff function pii is a continuous function
in s = (s1, s2, ..., sn).”
For carrier j, the decision variable pji is in the interval [0, pi max]. And pi max = ai/bi,
which solves d1i (p
1
i , p
2
i ) = 0 and d
2
i (p
1
i , p
2
i ) = 0, so the strategy space is convex and
compact. The payoff function is concave since
∑4
i=1 d
j
i (p
j
i − ci), −(dj2 + dj4 − dj1 − dj3)+
and −(dj1 +dj3−dj2−dj4)+ are concave in (pj1, pj2, pj3, pi4). Πj is a nonnegative weighted sum
of three concave functions, which is also concave. And obviously, the payoff function is
continuous. Therefore, we can conclude that there exists at least one pure strategy NE
in our problem.
(2) Symmetric NE
Cachon and Netessine (2004) suggests that for a symmetric game satisfying the three
conditions listed in the existence of NE argument mentioned above, there exists at least
one symmetric pure strategy NE.
(3) Uniqueness of NE
Cachon and Netessine (2004) points out that ”If the best response mapping is a
contraction on the entire strategy space, there is a unique NE in the game.”
Given carrier 2’s price decision (p21, p
2
2, p
2
3, p
2
4), carrier 1’s best response function can
be derived from Proposition 1, which is:
(p11, p
1
2, p
1
3, p
1
4) = f1(p
2
1, p
2
2, p
2
3, p
2
4) =
(
a1+γ1p
2
1
b1+γ1
+c1+T
2
0
2 ,
a2+γ2p
2
2
b2+γ2
+c2−T 20
2 ,
a3+γ3p
2
3
b3+γ3
,
a4+γ4p
2
4
b4+γ4
) if max(
a3+γ3p
2
3
b3+γ3
− c3,−c5) < T 20 < min(c4 − a4+γ4p
2
4
b4+γ4
, c6)
(
a1+γ1p
2
1
b1+γ1
+c1+c6
2 ,
a2+γ2p
2
2
b2+γ2
+c2−c6
2 ,
a3+γ3p
2
3
b3+γ3
,
a4+γ4p
2
4
b4+γ4
) if c6 ≤ T 20 , c6 < c4 − a4+γ4p
2
4
b4+γ4
(
a1+γ1p
2
1
b1+γ1
+c1−c5
2 ,
a2+γ2p
2
2
b2+γ2
+c2+c5
2 ,
a3+γ3p
2
3
b3+γ3
,
a4+γ4p
2
4
b4+γ4
) if c5 ≤ −T 20 , c5 < c3 − a3+γ3p
2
3
b3+γ3
(
a1+γ1p
2
1
b1+γ1
+c1+T
2
1
2 ,
a2+γ2p
2
2
b2+γ2
+c2−T 21
2 ,
a3+γ3p
2
3
b3+γ3
,
a4+γ4p
2
4
b4+γ4
+c4−T 21
2 ) if T
2
1 < c6, c4 − a4+γ4p
2
4
b4+γ4
≤ T 21 ≤ a1+γ1p
2
1
b1+γ1
− c1
(
a1+γ1p
2
1
b1+γ1
+c1−T 22
2 ,
a2+γ2p
2
2
b2+γ2
+c2+T
2
2
2 ,
a3+γ3p
2
3
b3+γ3
+c3−T 22
2 ,
a4+γ4p
2
4
b4+γ4
) if T 22 < c5, c3 − a3+γ3p
2
3
b3+γ3
≤ T 22 ≤ a2+γ2p
2
2
b2+γ2
− c2
(
a1+γ1p
2
1
b1+γ1
+c1+c6
2 ,
a2+γ2p
2
2
b2+γ2
+c2−c6
2 ,
a3+γ3p
2
3
b3+γ3
,
a4+γ4p
2
4
b4+γ4
+c4−c6
2 ) if c4 − a4+γ4p
2
4
b4+γ4
≤ c6 ≤ min(a1+γ1p
2
1
b1+γ1
− c1, T 21 )
(
a1+γ1p
2
1
b1+γ1
+c1−c5
2 ,
a2+γ2p
2
2
b2+γ2
+c2+c5
2 ,
a3+γ3p
2
3
b3+γ3
+c3−c5
2 ,
a4+γ4p
2
4
b4+γ4
) if c3 − a3+γ3p
2
3
b3+γ3
≤ c5 ≤ min(a2+γ2p
2
2
b2+γ2
− c2, T 22 )
where T 20 =
(a1+γ1p
2
1−(b1+γ1)c1)−(a2+γ2p22−(b2+γ2)c2)
b1+γ1+b2+γ2
, T 21 =
(a1+γ1p
2
1−(b1+γ1)c1)−(a2+γ2p22−(b2+γ2)c2)−(a4+γ4p24−(b4+γ4)c4)
b1+γ1+b2+γ2+b4+γ4
,
T 22 =
(a2+γ2p
2
2−(b2+γ2)c2)−(a1+γ1p21−(b1+γ1)c1)−(a3+γ3p23−(b3+γ3)c3)
b1+γ1+b2+γ2+b3+γ3
.
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The best response function for carrier 1 is a piece-wise linear function. And carrier 2
also has such piece-wise linear function (p21, p
2
2, p
2
3, p
2
4) = f2(p
1
1, p
1
2, p
1
3, p
1
4). Then the best
response mapping can be written as:
f(p11, p
1
2, p
1
3, p
1
4, p
2
1, p
2
2, p
2
3, p
2
4) = (f1(p
2
1, p
2
2, p
2
3, p
2
4), f2(p
1
1, p
1
2, p
1
3, p
1
4)) (11)
Now we need to prove that this mapping is a contraction mapping.
Let f(p11, p
1
2, p
1
3, p
1
4, p
2
1, p
2
2, p
2
3, p
2
4) = (g1, g2, g3, g4, g5, g6, g7, g8) and define the following
matrix H, where the entry hij is:
hij =

∂gi
∂p1j
if j ≤ 4
∂gi
∂p2j−4
if j > 4
To show the mapping (11) is a contraction mapping, it suffices to show ‖H‖ < 1 for
any one matrix norm. The best response mapping (11) is a piece-wise linear function
with 49 segments, and we only show that ‖H‖∞ < 1 in one segment.
Let T 12 =
(a2+γ2p12−(b2+γ2)c2)−(a1+γ1p11−(b1+γ1)c1)−(a3+γ3p13−(b3+γ3)c3)
b1+γ1+b2+γ2+b3+γ3
.
If max(
a3+γ3p23
b3+γ3
− c3,−c5) < T 20 < min(c4 − a4+γ4p
2
4
b4+γ4
, c6) and c3 − a3+γ3p
1
3
b3+γ3
≤ c5 ≤
min(
a2+γ2p12
b2+γ2
− c2, T 12 ), then
(g1, g2, g3, g4) = (
a1+γ1p21
b1+γ1
+ c1 + T
2
0
2
,
a2+γ2p22
b2+γ2
+ c2 − T 20
2
,
a3 + γ3p
2
3
b3 + γ3
,
a4 + γ4p
2
4
b4 + γ4
)
(g5, g6, g7, g8) = (
a1+γ1p11
b1+γ1
+ c1 − c5
2
,
a2+γ2p12
b2+γ2
+ c2 + c5
2
,
a3+γ3p13
b3+γ3
+ c3 − c5
2
,
a4 + γ4p
1
4
b4 + γ4
)
Therefore,
‖H‖∞ =max( γ1
2(b1 + γ1)
+
γ1 + γ2
2(b1 + γ1 + b2 + γ2)
,
γ2
2(b2 + γ2)
+
γ1 + γ2
2(b1 + γ1 + b2 + γ2)
,
γ3
b3 + γ3
,
γ4
b4 + γ4
,
γ1
2(b1 + γ1)
,
γ2
2(b2 + γ2)
,
γ3
2(b3 + γ3)
,
γ4
b4 + γ4
) < 1
And ‖H‖∞ < 1 in other segments can be verified in a similar way. Therefore, the
uniqueness of NE can be guaranteed.
A.6 Proof of proposition 5
According to the best response function calculated in the proof of Theorem 1, if
(1) max(
a3+γ3p23
b3+γ3
− c3,−c5) < T 20 < min(c4 − a4+γ4p
2
4
b4+γ4
, c6)
p11 =
a1+γ1p21
b1+γ1
+ c1 + T
2
0
2
, p12 =
a2+γ2p22
b2+γ2
+ c2 − T 20
2
, p13 =
a3 + γ3p
2
3
b3 + γ3
, p14 =
a4 + γ4p
2
4
b4 + γ4
.
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Since p1i = p
2
i for i = 1, 2, 3, 4, by solving the equations, we have
pj1 =
a1
b1+γ1
+ c1 + T
D
0
2− ρ1 , p
j
2 =
a2
b2+γ2
+ c2 − TD0
2− ρ2 , p
j
3 =
a3
b3
, pj4 =
a4
b4
.
where ρi =
γi
bi+γi
, TD0 = (
a1−b1c1
2−ρ1 − a2−b2c22−ρ2 )/( b12−ρ1 + b22−ρ2 ).
To satisfy the constraint on T 20 , we have max(
a3
b3
− c3,−c5) < TD0 < min(c4 − a4b4 , c6).
(2) c6 ≤ T 20 , c6 < c4 − a4+γ4p
2
4
b4+γ4
p11 =
a1+γ1p21
b1+γ1
+ c1 + c6
2
, p12 =
a2+γ2p22
b2+γ2
+ c2 − c6
2
, p13 =
a3 + γ3p
2
3
b3 + γ3
, p14 =
a4 + γ4p
2
4
b4 + γ4
.
Since p1i = p
2
i for i = 1, 2, 3, 4, by solving the equations, we have
pj1 =
a1
b1+γ1
+ c1 + c6
2− ρ1 , p
j
2 =
a2
b2+γ2
+ c2 − c6
2− ρ2 , p
j
3 =
a3
b3
, pj4 =
a4
b4
.
To satisfy the constraint on T 20 , we have c6 ≤ TD0 , c6 < c4 − a4b4 .
(3) c5 ≤ −T 20 , c5 < c3 − a3+γ3p
2
3
b3+γ3
p11 =
a1+γ1p21
b1+γ1
+ c1 − c5
2
, p12 =
a2+γ2p22
b2+γ2
+ c2 + c5
2
, p13 =
a3 + γ3p
2
3
b3 + γ3
, p14 =
a4 + γ4p
2
4
b4 + γ4
.
Since p1i = p
2
i for i = 1, 2, 3, 4, by solving the equations, we have
pj1 =
a1
b1+γ1
+ c1 − c5
2− ρ1 , p
j
2 =
a2
b2+γ2
+ c2 + c5
2− ρ2 , p
j
3 =
a3
b3
, pj4 =
a4
b4
.
To satisfy the constraint on T 20 , we have c5 ≤ −TD0 , c5 < c3 − a3b3 .
(4) T 21 < c6, c4 − a4+γ4p
2
4
b4+γ4
≤ T 21 ≤ a1+γ1p
2
1
b1+γ1
− c1
p11 =
a1+γ1p21
b1+γ1
+ c1 + T
2
1
2
, p12 =
a2+γ2p22
b2+γ2
+ c2 − T 21
2
, p13 =
a3 + γ3p
2
3
b3 + γ3
, p14 =
a4+γ4p24
b4+γ4
+ c4 − T 21
2
.
Since p1i = p
2
i for i = 1, 2, 3, 4, by solving the equations, we have
pj1 =
a1
b1+γ1
+ c1 + T
D
1
2− ρ1 , p
j
2 =
a2
b2+γ2
+ c2 − TD1
2− ρ2 , p
j
3 =
a3
b3
, pj4 =
a4
b4+γ4
+ c4 − TD1
2− ρ4 .
where TD1 = (
a1−b1c1
2−ρ1 − a2−b2c22−ρ2 − a4−b4c42−ρ4 )/( b12−ρ1 + b22−ρ2 + b42−ρ4 ).
To satisfy the constraint on T 21 , we have T
D
1 ≤ a1b1 − c1, c4 − a4b4 ≤ TD1 < c6.
(5) T 22 < c5, c3 − a3+γ3p
2
3
b3+γ3
≤ T 22 ≤ a2+γ2p
2
2
b2+γ2
− c2
p11 =
a1+γ1p21
b1+γ1
+ c1 − T 22
2
, p12 =
a2+γ2p22
b2+γ2
+ c2 + T
2
2
2
, p13 =
a3+γ3p23
b3+γ3
+ c3 − T 22
2
, p14 =
a4 + γ4p
2
4
b4 + γ4
.
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Since p1i = p
2
i for i = 1, 2, 3, 4, by solving the equations, we have
pj1 =
a1
b1+γ1
+ c1 − TD2
2− ρ1 , p
j
2 =
a2
b2+γ2
+ c2 + T
D
2
2− ρ2 , p
j
3 =
a3
b3+γ3
+ c3 − TD2
2− ρ3 , p
j
4 =
a4
b4
.
where TD2 = (
a2−b2c2
2−ρ2 − a1−b1c12−ρ1 − a3−b3c32−ρ3 )/( b12−ρ1 + b22−ρ2 + b32−ρ3 ).
To satisfy the constraint on T 22 , we have T
D
2 ≤ a2b2 − c2, c3 − a3b3 ≤ TD2 < c5.
(6) c4 − a4+γ4p
2
4
b4+γ4
≤ c6 ≤ min(a1+γ1p
2
1
b1+γ1
− c1, T 21 )
p11 =
a1+γ1p21
b1+γ1
+ c1 + c6
2
, p12 =
a2+γ2p22
b2+γ2
+ c2 − c6
2
, p13 =
a3 + γ3p
2
3
b3 + γ3
, p14 =
a4+γ4p24
b4+γ4
+ c4 − c6
2
.
Since p1i = p
2
i for i = 1, 2, 3, 4, by solving the equations, we have
pj1 =
a1
b1+γ1
+ c1 + c6
2− ρ1 , p
j
2 =
a2
b2+γ2
+ c2 − c6
2− ρ2 , p
j
3 =
a3
b3
, pj4 =
a4
b4+γ4
+ c4 − c6
2− ρ4 .
To satisfy the constraint on T 21 , we have c4 − a4b4 ≤ c6 ≤ min(a1b1 − c1, TD1 ).
(7) c3 − a3+γ3p
2
3
b3+γ3
≤ c5 ≤ min(a2+γ2p
2
2
b2+γ2
− c2, T 22 )
p11 =
a1+γ1p21
b1+γ1
+ c1 − c5
2
, p12 =
a2+γ2p22
b2+γ2
+ c2 + c5
2
, p13 =
a3+γ3p23
b3+γ3
+ c3 − c5
2
, p14 =
a4 + γ4p
2
4
b4 + γ4
.
Since p1i = p
2
i for i = 1, 2, 3, 4, by solving the equations, we have
pj1 =
a1
b1+γ1
+ c1 − c5
2− ρ1 , p
j
2 =
a2
b2+γ2
+ c2 + c5
2− ρ2 , p
j
3 =
a3
b3+γ3
+ c3 − c5
2− ρ3 , p
j
4 =
a4
b4
.
To satisfy the constraint on T 22 , we have c3 − a3b3 ≤ c5 ≤ min(a2b2 − c2, TD2 ).
Then we can calculate the corresponding demand and profit by dji = ai−bipji +γi(pki −
pji ),and Π
j(pj1, p
j
2, p
j
3, p
j
4) =
∑4
i=1 d
j
i (p
j
i−cji )−(dj2 +dj4−dj1−dj3)+cj5−(dj1 +dj3−dj2−dj4)+cj6,
which is summarized in Table 4.
A.7 Proof of proposition 6
This proposition follows the results in Table 4.
A.8 Proof of proposition 7
We only analyze the impact of γ1 and γ3 , and the impact of γ2 and γ4 can be analyzed
in a similar way. Let fi =
1
(2−ρi)2(bi+γi) =
bi+γi
(2bi+γi)2
, then ∂fi
∂γi
= − γi
(2bi+γi)3
< 0. Therefore,
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∂Πj∗
∂γ1
< 0 (Case 2 3 6 7) and ∂Π
j∗
∂γ3
< 0 (Case 7) can be easily checked. Besides,
∂Πj∗
∂γ1
= − d
j∗
1
(2b1 + γ1)(b1 + γ1)
dj∗1 ρ1
b2
2−ρ2 + b1d
j∗
2
ρ2
2−ρ2
b1
2−ρ1 +
b2
2−ρ2
< 0 (Case 1)
∂Πj∗
∂γ1
= − d
j∗
1
(2b1 + γ1)(b1 + γ1)
dj∗1 ρ1(
b2
2−ρ2 +
b4
2−ρ4 ) + b1(d
j∗
2
ρ2
2−ρ2 + d
j∗
4
ρ4
2−ρ4 )
b1
2−ρ1 +
b2
2−ρ2 +
b4
2−ρ4
< 0 (Case 4)
∂Πj∗
∂γ1
= − d
j∗
1
(2b1 + γ1)(b1 + γ1)
dj∗1 ρ1(
b2
2−ρ2 +
b3
2−ρ3 ) + b1(d
j∗
2
ρ2
2−ρ2 − d
j∗
3
ρ3
2−ρ3 )
b1
2−ρ1 +
b2
2−ρ2 +
b3
2−ρ3
< 0 (Case 5)
∂Πj∗
∂γ3
= − d
j∗
3
(2b3 + γ3)(b3 + γ3)
dj∗3 ρ3(
b2
2−ρ2 +
b1
2−ρ1 ) + b3(d
j∗
2
ρ2
2−ρ2 − d
j∗
1
ρ1
2−ρ1 )
b1
2−ρ1 +
b2
2−ρ2 +
b3
2−ρ3
< 0 (Case 5)
Then Proposition 7 follows these results.
A.9 Proof of proposition 8
(1) In case 3:
∂Πj∗
∂c5
=
2(a1 − b1(c1 − c5))
(2− ρ1)2(b1 + γ1) b1 +
2(a2 − b2(c2 + c5))
(2− ρ2)2(b2 + γ2) (−b2)
=
2(a1 − b1c1)
(2− ρ1)2/(1− ρ1) −
2(a2 − b2c2)
(2− ρ2)2/(1− ρ2) + (
2b1
(2− ρ1)2/(1− ρ1) +
2b2
(2− ρ2)2/(1− ρ2) )c5
(2) In case 2:
∂Πj∗
∂c6
=
2(a1 − b1(c1 + c6))
(2− ρ1)2(b1 + γ1) (−b1) +
2(a2 − b2(c2 − c6))
(2− ρ2)2(b2 + γ2) b2
= − 2(a1 − b1c1)
(2− ρ1)2/(1− ρ1) +
2(a2 − b2c2)
(2− ρ2)2/(1− ρ2) + (
2b1
(2− ρ1)2/(1− ρ1) +
2b2
(2− ρ2)2/(1− ρ2) )c6
(3) In case 7:
∂Πj∗
∂c5
=
2(a1 − b1(c1 − c5))
(2− ρ1)2(b1 + γ1) b1 +
2(a2 − b2(c2 + c5))
(2− ρ2)2(b2 + γ2) (−b2) +
2(a3 − b3(c3 − c5))
(2− ρ3)2(b3 + γ3) b3
=
2(a1 − b1c1)
(2− ρ1)2/(1− ρ1) −
2(a2 − b2c2)
(2− ρ2)2/(1− ρ2) +
2(a3 − b3c3)
(2− ρ3)2/(1− ρ3)
+ (
2b1
(2− ρ1)2/(1− ρ1) +
2b2
(2− ρ2)2/(1− ρ2) +
2b3
(2− ρ3)2/(1− ρ3) )c5
(4) In case 6:
∂Πj∗
∂c6
=
2(a1 − b1(c1 + c6))
(2− ρ1)2(b1 + γ1) (−b1) +
2(a2 − b2(c2 − c6))
(2− ρ2)2(b2 + γ2) b2 +
2(a4 − b4(c4 − c6))
(2− ρ4)2(b4 + γ4) b4
= − 2(a1 − b1c1)
(2− ρ1)2/(1− ρ1) +
2(a2 − b2c2)
(2− ρ2)2/(1− ρ2) +
2(a4 − b4c4)
(2− ρ4)2/(1− ρ4)
+ (
2b1
(2− ρ1)2/(1− ρ1) +
2b2
(2− ρ2)2/(1− ρ2) +
2b4
(2− ρ4)2/(1− ρ4) )c6
Then Proposition 8 follows these results.
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